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Abstract
Nigeria’s leadership role within the West-African sub-
region and on the continent of Africa is incontestable 
given her tremendous and unparallel financial and 
human capital contributions to the freedom, peace 
and stability of brother and sister nations in Africa. Its 
favourable geography, population and immense natural 
resources naturally destined for the country to play 
leadership role on the continent of Africa and this it has 
done by constantly according special attention to the 
plight of its brothers and sisters in Africa. However, 
Nigeria’s leadership is yet to come to terms with the 
obvious that economic interests matter even when 
peace, freedom, sovereignty and security issues seem 
paramount. Nigeria’s foreign policy is conducted on 
the pedestal of “Big Brotherism” without concomitant 
and lucidly wrapped economic agenda that benefits the 
people and government of Nigeria. This paper examines 
the logic and reasonability of Nigeria’s tremendous 
human and material contributions to the political 
stability of other African states within the context of 
pan-Africanism without concrete strategy for economic 
gains to the people and government of Nigeria. The 
methodology of the study is mainly descriptive and 
analytical drawing data largely from documented 
materials. 
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In the international system, nation states coexist, compete 
and cooperate in the exploitation and distribution of 
their natural resources. These states also have various 
capabilities and resources which are usually transferred 
or shared amongst nation states. In the process of such 
transference or sharing, international relations/cooperation 
as well as social and cultural relationships are enhanced. 
Nigeria’s involvement in international relations started as 
a colonial territory and even the earliest recorded history 
of the regions now known as Nigeria interacted with the 
outside world in trade and through other social relations. 
Great empires like Benin Kingdom, Oyo Empire, Kanem-
Borno as well as the coastal kingdoms had various 
commercial, economic and social relations with other 
nation-states. After the attainment of independence, 
Nigeria’s relation with other states was entirely in its 
hands to decide in terms of which nations in the world 
we wanted to associate with on matters of trade, technical 
support, financial aid and in other forms of relations 
generally.
Since her independence in 1960, Nigeria has always 
seen itself as a major power in Africa due largely to its 
abundance of human and natural resources, and this 
has influenced its decision of making Africa the centre 
piece of its foreign policies (Bello-Imam, 2010). This 
suggests that Nigeria’s foreign policy interests are best 
realised within the African continent as a platform for 
launching itself into global reckoning and remain a force 
in international affairs. Nigeria is also the preponderant 
political leader of the West African sub-region owing to its 
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natural resource endowments and demographic statistics. 
This reflected in Nigeria being the founding force 
behind the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) with enormous responsibilities. The impact 
of Nigeria in other organizations including the African 
Union (AU) and the United Nations Organizations (UNO) 
especially on issues of peace and stability on the African 
continent and other parts of the globe is manifestly visible. 
Remarkably, Nigeria has participated in peacekeeping 
operations in many African countries including Angola, 
Somalia, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Mali, Liberia 
and Guinea-Bissau (Adeniyi, 2015). It also actively 
participated in waging war against Apartheid regime in 
South Africa and the subsequent liberation of the country. 
It has equally deployed unparallel political diplomatic 
resources in the resolution of disputes in Chad and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo while its efforts in the 
promotion of cooperation with other African nations in all 
fields of human endeavour through economic exchanges 
and regional integration of members are outstanding. 
This has been achieved through the deployment of more 
Technical Aide Corps (TAC) volunteers whose services 
have been in high demand by other countries to assist 
in the areas of their manpower needs (Okunnu, 2010). 
These include but not limited to medical and paramedical 
officials, judicial officers, military and civilian personnel. 
Within the context of these souring records of Nigeria’s 
pan-Africanist efforts, the domestic environment in terms 
of security and economic growth remains unattractive 
because the foreign policy objectives projected by the 
Nigerian state are not situated within any lucidly defined 
national interest. 
Beyond the need to maintain stability on the African 
continent as a preventive measure in securing the territory 
of the Nigerian state, economic interest should underscore 
such effort because economic goals underline diplomatic 
manoeuvres of any nation desirous of development (Tull, 
2006). This paper therefore examines Nigeria’s efforts at 
promoting peace and stability on the African continent 
without concomitant economic interest in and penetration 
of the economies of benefiting states. This economic 
diplomatic weakness is rooted in the absence of lucidly 
articulated national interest guiding Nigeria’s foreign 
policy. In addition to the introduction, the paper has 
five sections. Section two that follows the introduction 
briefly discusses key concepts, section three attempts an 
overview of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence 
while section four explores Nigeria’s human and capital 
contributions to the stability of Africa. Section five 
examines China’s economic diplomacy in Africa and the 
lessons for Nigeria while chapter six concludes the study. 
1. CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE
Without doubt, foreign policy like any other concept in 
the social sciences has suffered from definitional problem. 
This is due majorly to the differences among scholars on 
the theoretical foundations that underline the imperatives 
of foreign policy. Though, there are differences in the 
theoretical orientation of scholars on foreign policy, 
there is no disagreement on the notion that foreign policy 
remains guidelines that shape the relationship of one 
nation with another. In other words, foreign policy is 
a body of decisions formulated to serve as the guiding 
principles of a nation-state in its interaction with other 
nation-states. Unlike other domestic policies, it consists 
of the fundamental principles on the basis of which a 
nation-state relates with other nation-states. However, 
each nation-state’s interaction is largely influenced by its 
domestic scene. Miller (1981) defined foreign policy as 
presumably something less than the sum of all policies 
which has an effect on a national government’s relations 
with other national governments. Frankel (1975) describes 
foreign policy as consisting of decisions and actions which 
involve to some appreciable extent, relations between 
one state and another. It is important to mention that such 
relations must clearly be reflective of the national interest 
consideration of the states (Idachaba, 2009). It is in this 
sense that Akinboye (1999) described foreign policy as 
the instrumentality by which states influence or seek to 
influence the external world and to attain objectives that 
are in consonance with their perceived national interest. 
Foreign policy is a result-oriented process (Akinyemi, 
2004) thus it is the strategy or planned course of action 
developed by the decision makers of a state vis-a–vis 
other states or international entities aimed at achieving 
specific goals, defined in terms of the national interest. 
For the purpose of this paper, we chose to describe foreign 
policy as an instrument adopted by states to exploit the 
international arena in achieving their national interest 
and project their image on the global stage through 
interactions with other states. 
Interestingly, the central theme in foreign policy is 
economic diplomacy which principally is facilitated by 
economic globalization. This reflects intensified activity 
that targets the realization and protection of economic 
priorities and interests (Sanders, 1996). Importantly, these 
interests should prompt the penetration of other countries 
with services, labour and investments that in return help 
to strengthen domestic economy thereby increasing the 
prosperity of the people since “butter and bread” issues 
are the principal objectives for growth and prosperity 
of people (Pogoson, 2011, p.43). Economic diplomacy 
therefore focuses on embarking on external economic 
policy that is considered much of direct benefit to the 
well-being of the people (Pogoson, 2011, p.42). Economic 
diplomacy thus speaks to the promotion and protection 
of nation’s interests in the sphere of economic relations. 
The role of the state in this regard and diplomacy as a tool 
remains highly relevant. As emphasised by Potter (2004, 
p.55), diplomacy has always been concerned with trade 
therefore economic and trade diplomacy encompasses 
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international negotiations on market access. Thus, 
commerce remains an important motivation for reaching 
out to other foreign entities as done in the ancient 
days of relations between kingdoms and principalities 
(Pogoson, 2011, p.43). Commercial diplomacy relates 
to the application of the tools of diplomacy to help bring 
about specific commercial gains through promoting 
exports, attracting inward investment and preserving 
outward investment opportunities, and encouraging the 
benefits of technology transfer (Potter, 2004, p.55). This 
involves trading policies, which are essentially influenced 
by politics. Fordham (1998) noted that powerful states 
with imperial ambitions have historically treated the 
preservation of access to particular sites for trade and 
investment as vital national interests, securing them 
with military means. If properly articulated, commercial 
diplomacy would have availed Nigeria in its quest to be 
big brother to its African brothers and sisters through the 
provision of financial, military, human and technological 
assistance to troubled countries, an opportunity to exploit 
these comparative advantages and capitalize on the 
international opportunities created by economic diplomacy 
and the evolution of markets to launch its hegemony in 
a way that transforms the domestic economy and places 
higher values on Nigerian goods and services in the 
competitive global market. What comes to mind here is 
how the United State used World War II to establish an 
international system open to US trade and investment, 
one where American power predominate. However, the 
pattern of support to Nigeria’s foreign policy can simply 
be explained in terms of peace and security imperatives 
that are not accompanied by economic interest and gains. 
Nigeria’s involvement in international relation 
especially on the African continent has been conducted 
on the platform of “big brotherism” which is bolstered 
by its potentials for fast economic development after 
independence. These potentials are also greatly founded 
on the enormous human and natural resource endowment 
of the nation. Nigeria’s big brother foreign policy and 
diplomacy in Africa is thus predicated on the aspiration 
of becoming Africa’s political and economic power-house 
sustained by its control of huge natural resources. As noted 
by Ebohon and Isike (2004, p.11), the foreign policy of any 
nation is determined by a number of factors chief among 
which include its economy, geography and population 
and Nigeria is quite blessed with a combination of these 
factors. This inadvertently, gives Nigeria an assertive and 
adventurous big-brother diplomacy profile in West Africa 
(Ebohon & Isike, 2004, p.13). The big-brother posture of 
Nigeria on the African continent logically derives from the 
incontrovertible fact that successive Nigerian governments 
have consistently accorded special attention to the plight 
and conditions of her brothers and sisters in Africa as 
reflected in the basic principles guiding her foreign policy 
(Okunnu, 2010). A review of Nigeria’s human capital and 
natural resources endowment are captured thus:
Nigeria, in addition to its huge population is endowed with 
significant agricultural, marine and forest resources. Its multiple 
vegetation zones, plentiful rain, surface water and underground 
water resources, and moderate climate allow for production of 
diverse food and cash crops…. Oil and gas, by value, are the 
most important minerals. They are exploited and produced in 
the Niger-Delta basin and off-shore on the continental shelf and 
in the deep sea of the territorial waters. Nevertheless, there are 
significant non-oil mineral deposits which have been identified 
and evaluated: coal, iron ore, gypsum, phosphate, limestone, 
marble, columbite, barite and gold. (Ebohon & Isike 2004, p.10)
The submission of an observer aptly lends credence 
to the above staggering human and economic profile of 
Nigeria thus:
No doubt, Nigeria is potentially Africa’s largest economy. 
Every year, the country produces over 200,000 graduates of 
tertiary institutions (including 93 universities both public and 
private ones); has the sixth largest gas reserves in the world; 
tenth largest oil producer with abundant but untapped natural 
resources-gold, limestone among others and with 60% of its 
arable land lying fallow. (Ojo, 2009, p.209)
The economic, geographical and population attributes 
of Nigeria naturally destined her to play leadership roles 
in the affairs of the African continent. This leadership role, 
Nigeria has been playing for decades notwithstanding the 
financial, social, political and diplomatic challenges that 
come with it (Okunnu, 2010).
2. OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA’S FOREIGN 
POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives and principles at 
independence according to Lamido (2002) consist of the 
following: The protection of the sovereign and territorial 
integrity of the Nigerian state; the promotion of economic 
and social well-being of Nigerians; the enhancement 
of Nigeria’s image and status in the World at large; the 
promotion of unity as well as the total political, economic, 
social and cultural liberation of our country and Africa; 
the promotion of the rights of the black people and others 
under colonial domination; the promotion of international 
cooperation, conducive to the consolidation of world 
peace and security; mutual respect and friendship among 
all peoples among the state; redressing the imbalance 
in the international power structures that has tended 
to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of developing 
countries; the promotion of world Peace based on the 
principles of freedom, mutual respect and equality of all 
persons of the world.
However, the Nigerian government pursued a modest 
policy which was evident in Balewa’s decision to uphold 
the principles inscribed in the Organisation of African 
Unity 1963 charter which provides for: non-interference, 
legal equality of states and boundary inviolability 
(Ogunbadejo, 1979, 1980). Regionally, Nigeria was 
overshadowed by Ghana, governed by the charismatic 
president, Kwame Nkrumah (Ihonvbere, 1991). Nigeria 
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was also trying to resist French encirclement since all 
of Nigeria’s geographic neighbours are francophone 
states, which were strongly influenced by their former 
metropole, even after they achieved formal independence. 
Nigeria’s efforts to secure local influence were limited to 
the creation of cooperative multilateral governing bodies, 
such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the River 
Niger Commission (Aluko, 1973).
Increased efforts to achieve a more prominent regional 
leadership role foundered during the civil war (1967-
1970). In addition to being challenged by violent domestic 
separatists, the Nigerian state was actively opposed by 
France, the Côte d’Ivoire, Portugal and South Africa. Of 
course, the civil war revealed the dangers of continued 
European involvement on the continent, as well as the 
importance of securing sub-regional allies. The Federal 
Government, which, in spite of Nigeria’s nominally non-
aligned status, had previously demonstrated a solidly 
pro-western orientation, now began to court more active 
engagement with the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republic (USSR) and China (Gambari, 1975). Post war 
leaders also went to greater lengths to reduce France’s 
local influence and to reconcile with other states in the 
sub-region, including civil war enemies, such as Côte 
d’Ivoire, and earlier rivals, like Ghana (Ihonvbere, 1991). 
Nigeria`s need to be less isolated was obvious. Obviously, 
good neighbourliness had become a security concern, as 
well as a normative principle (Aluko, 1981). However, a 
more discrete approach would have been appreciated.
Efforts to reconcile with geographic neighbours and 
achieve a sub-regional leadership role were facilitated 
by Nigeria’s oil boom. Nigeria struck oil in 1956, near 
the inland city of Oloibiri. This discovery was soon 
augmented by large finds in the Delta region. By 1973, 
Nigeria was the world’s ninth largest oil exporter (Aluko, 
1973). The petroleum price increases of the early1970s 
and the Arab energy embargo of 1973 generated an 
enormous rise in Nigerian state revenue. At the same time, 
Nigeria was attracting increased foreign direct investment. 
The Federal Government used this new income to pursue 
a sub-regional foreign policy amidst domestic economic 
problems. Nigeria provided financial assistance to its 
neighbours, with the aim of weaning them off dependence 
on France. In 1974, Nigeria announced that it would sell 
oil to its energy-poor neighbours at concessionary prices 
(Aluko, 1981).
Additionally, Nigeria used regional economic 
integration as a means of advancing its leadership and 
reducing local French influence. The Head of State, 
General Gowon (1966-1975) promoted bilateral trading 
pacts, the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) 
economic bodies, and the establishment of a new 
international institution for regional integration: the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
Local francophone states initially hesitated to participate 
in a Nigerian-led organization. However, Gowon 
decided to move forward with the scheme by starting 
with Anglophone states like Togo. He gained greater 
francophone confidence by leading negotiations for the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries to gain 
observer status in the European Economic Community 
(EEC) (DeLancy, 1983; Abegunrin, 2003). The resultant 
Lomé Convention was signed on February 28, 1975. 
ECOWAS came into existence three months later. 
On July 29, 1975, General Gowon was overthrown in 
a military coup. His two successors, Murtala Mohammed 
(1975-76) and Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979) advanced 
a more assertive, activist foreign policy. They were less 
interested in Nigeria’s immediate geographic neighbours 
and less devoted to ECOWAS and the OAU. Instead, 
Murtala and Obasanjo implemented a more militant 
pan-African foreign policy that, in particular, aimed to 
challenge the minority rule regimes of Southern Africa 
(Aluko, 1976). Nigeria intervened in the Angolan civil 
war, supporting the MPLA against the US-supported 
FNLA and UNITA (Abegunrin, 2003). In 1976, Nigeria 
and some other African leaders encouraged other African 
states to boycott the Montreal Olympic Games in order 
to protest New Zealand’s interactions with apartheid 
South Africa (DeLancy, 1983). In 1978, the state gained 
a rotating seat in the United Nations Security Council, 
giving it another platform for its anti-apartheid sentiment 
(Bach, 1983).
Under the democratically elected President Shagari 
(1979-1983), oil revenue peaked and then dramatically 
declined (Shaw, 1987). In January 1983, the Nigerian 
government responded to the economic downturn by 
expelling illegal immigrants. This was the state’s “worst 
international crisis since the civil war” (Abegunrin, 
2003). It antagonized Nigeria’s neighbours and further 
undermined sub-regional integration (Gambari, 1989). 
This pattern continued under Shagari’s successor, Buhari 
(1983-1985). He began his military rule with overtures 
to Nigeria’s neighbours. However, after further religious 
riots in Yola in 1984, he closed the state’s boundaries as 
a means of containing international migration (Gambari, 
1989). The protectionist move was lambasted within the 
sub-region. As at April 1986 All Nigeria Conference on 
Foreign Policy (the Kuru Conference), participants averred 
that they wished to maintain a sub-regional leadership 
role by promoting development and economic integration, 
supporting the OAU, and continuing to reduce France’s 
local influence (Akindele & Ate, 1986). However, given 
the state’s dependence on petroleum revenue, as oil prices 
continued to decline, Nigerian leaders possessed limited 
means of achieving these foreign policy goals. From 
1986 to1988, Babangida’s new government was forced 
to respond to the economic crisis by implementing a 
structural adjustment program (Sesay & Ukeje, 1997). 
By the end of 1980s, retrenchment enabled Nigeria to 
regain a bit of its prior regional standing. In 1990, Nigeria 
led West Africa’s Anglophone states in establishing 
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ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group), which 
intervened in Liberia following the overthrow of leader 
Samuel Doe. The move was partly personal because Doe 
and Babangida were friends with the aim of preventing 
outside military forces from intervening in the region 
(Abegunrin, 2003; Yoroms, 1993). This effort was 
facilitated by a secular decline in French engagement 
in the area that had occurred by 1990 (Adebajo, 2000). 
Nonetheless, sub-regional concerns arose over Nigeria’s 
apparent willingness to violate its longstanding principle 
of non-interference in other African states’ internal affairs. 
Moreover, some West African countries suspected that 
Nigeria was taking advantage of the Liberian conflict to 
advance a local “Pax Nigeriana” (Saliu, 2000; Yoroms, 
1993). Mistrust was exacerbated by Babangida’s domestic 
political ruthlessness and the repeated postponements of 
Nigeria’s transition back to civilian rule (Sesay & Ukeje, 
1997).
Nigeria’s international reputation degraded further 
following a major electoral controversy in 1993. After 
the June 12 victory of popular presidential candidate 
Moshood Abiola, Babangida annulled the national election 
results. Nigerians erupted in protest and the EU and US 
threatened sanctions. These responses were only partially 
effective. Although Babangida stepped aside from office, 
democracy was not restored. Following a brief period of 
interim governance by Ernest Shonekan, Sani Abacha 
seized power in another military coup. A month after the 
regime change, Abacha rattled the region by invading the 
Bakassi Peninsula, a purportedly oil-rich territory disputed 
with Cameroon. In March 1995, Abacha accused a large 
swath of the policy elite of a coup plot. The courts handed 
down over thirty death sentences. Following international 
condemnation and threats of increased sanctions, these 
were reduced to prison terms (Mahmud, 2001). However, 
Abacha’s clemency was short-lived. In November 
1995, he executed nine leaders of the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), including 
Ken Saro Wiwa. The US and EU responded to the new 
provocation by imposing broad sanctions. However, US 
sanctions did not include oil (Abegunrin, 2003; Mahmud, 
2001). This omission weakened the effectiveness of 
external calls for democratization (Sesay & Ukeje, 
1997). In addition, Abacha was somewhat successful in 
spinning the sanctions locally as an anti-imperial struggle 
(Mahmud, 2001). Internationally, Nigeria’s reputation was 
marginally rehabilitated in 1998, when Abacha initiated 
an ECOMOG intervention to restore democracy in Sierra 
Leone. The Great Powers’ failure to intervene effectively 
in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s had increased 
the attraction of regional peacekeeping efforts, particularly 
since, after the end of the Cold War, there was little 
strategic reason for superpower engagement in the region 
(Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003). Domestically, however, 
Abacha’s democratizing intervention was condemned for 
its hypocrisy and expense (Adebajo, 2000). 
Nigeria’s return to democratic rule was eventually 
facilitated by Abacha’s death in office in 1998. His 
successor, Abubakar, oversaw a transitional government 
before former military leader, Obasanjo again assumed 
poli t ical  leadership through a popular election. 
Obasanjo’s foreign policy priority was to restore Nigeria’s 
international reputation. Soon after he took power, 
Nigeria was readmitted to the Commonwealth of Nations. 
Sanctions were lifted. In 1999, Nigeria began pulling 
out of Sierra Leone, to cut costs and redirect resources 
to the Niger Delta, where the local security situation had 
deteriorated (Adebajo, 2000). In the West African sub-
region, Obasanjo presented himself as a peacekeeper. 
When the International Court of Justice ruled in 2002 that 
the contested Bakassi Peninsula belonged to Cameroon, 
Obasanjo contained intense Nigerian opposition to the 
verdict and initiated implementation efforts (Meierding, 
2010). Obasanjo also reiterated Nigeria’s support for 
ECOWAS and his desire to pursue more extensive 
regional integration (Kaplan, 2006).
Obasanjo’s affection for economic integration and 
international institutions attracted some domestic criticism 
(Adebajo & Landsberg, 2003). His continued engagement 
of Nigerian troops in multilateral peacekeeping operations 
in areas such as the Sudan also generated internal 
resistance. Yar’Adua’s assumption to office increased 
Nigeria’s rank as high on international corruption indexes. 
A cease-fire has been brokered with the Niger-Delta 
insurgents, but inter-confessional instability had increased 
in the north. Most recently, Nigeria has appeared on 
international terrorists watch lists, in the wake of the 
thwarted 2009 “Christmas Day bombing” in Detroit. 
Nonetheless, the state’s international reputation has 
improved significantly since 1999, in part because of the 
successful democratic power transitions. Since Nigeria 
started its big brother role, it has committed a quantum of 
its human and material resources in that direction without 
concrete attempts at using such opportunities to create 
economic space for the state and its people outside the 
shores of Nigeria.
3. NIGERIA’S FINANCIAL AND HUMAN 
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS AS ‘BIG 
BROTHER” ACTS?
Clearly, successive governments since Balewa have 
reaffirmed Nigeria’s basic commonwealth to the 
eradication of apartheid and the struggle against white 
minority domination in Southern Africa as one of the 
fundamental tenets of Nigeria’s foreign policy after 
independence. Another area which the nation’s foreign 
policy has witnessed continuity is in the settlement of 
disputes between countries in Africa and participation 
in peacekeeping missions within the African continent 
(Ade-Ibijola, 2013). Nigeria played leading roles in the 
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resolution of crisis in countries like Congo, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Sudan to mention 
a few since independence. Nigeria in her bid to ensure 
peace on the continent and the world at large has spent 
a colossal $10 billion and lost over 2,000 soldiers in the 
process. The country has sustained assistance to countries 
in Africa since its emergence as an independent state. 
Okunnu (2010) and Adeniyi (2015) summarized the 
contributions of Nigeria on the continent of Africa thus:
(a)  Nigeria’s participation in UN peacekeeping 
operation dated back to 1960 when it provided 
UN peacekeepers to Congo (ONUC) from 1960-
1964. Since then, the country has not looked 
back as an active participant in UN peacekeeping 
missions. Currently, Nigeria is one of the 
largest UN contributing countries with military 
and civilian personnel deployed in ten UN 
peacekeeping operations and the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 
(b)  Nigeria deployed the first set of Individual Police 
Officers (IPOs) in Africa in ONUC in 1960.
(c)  Outside UN missions, Nigeria has played pivotal 
roles in Africa and the West African sub-region. 
Regarded as the preponderant power in West 
Africa, Nigeria has been the main provider 
of military and other resources for ECOWAS 
peace operations to the tune of US$8 billion in 
its various missions in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone. During 
the peak of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil 
wars in the 1990s, Nigeria provided over 70% of 
ECOMOG’s military and civilian personnel as 
well as logistical support. 
(d)  In 2003, Nigeria deployed 1,500 troops to the 
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and 
a medical and signal team to the ECOWAS 
Mission in Cote d’Ivoire in 2003 (ECOMICI).
(e)  In 2004, Nigeria deployed 1,500 troops to Darfur 
as part of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).
(f)  Recently, Nigeria has provided 1,200 troops to 
the African-led International Support Mission 
in Mali (AFISMA), and 200 Police officers to 
AMISOM.
(g)  The pioneer Formed Police Unit (FPU) of 120 
officers was deployed by Nigeria in Liberia in 
2004.
Sadly, Nigeria often becomes the most affected donor-
state in AU or ECOWAS-led peace operations due to 
the financial constraints of these organizations (Adeniyi, 
2015) and more worrisome, Nigeria had on many 
occasions shouldered extensive monetary requirements for 
ECOMOG’s operation when other participating countries 
threatened to pull out due to lack of funds. However, 
since independence, Nigeria’s foreign policy lacks 
the most important ingredient of economic diplomacy 
which has partly contributed to the impoverishment 
of the nation itself. The absence of a national strategic 
framework means that Nigeria’s participation in peace 
support operations, given the fact that the nation is the 
fourth largest contributor of troops to United Nations 
peacekeeping missions across the world (Oyinlola, 2010; 
Adeniyi, 2015), is not driven by economic interest. Her 
foreign policy is deficient on this basis because Nigeria 
has refused to understand the need to secure concrete 
gains that would be commensurate with her enormous 
sacrifices on the international scene. Nigeria with her poor 
economic status has repeatedly failed to use its massive 
investments in African peace support operations to its 
advantage. This is a fundamental deficiency in her foreign 
policy that managers of Nigeria’s external relations are 
still struggling to grapple with. This situation is indeed 
embarrassing because there is no justifiable reason why 
“outside” problems should take priority over that of 
the “inside”. For a nation whose internal security has 
rapidly degenerated through catalogues of ethno-religious 
clashes, armed robbery, kidnapping and lately terrorism, 
exacerbated by a high level of poverty and unemployment, 
it defiles logic and reason to be preoccupied with restoring 
peace in other climes as doing this amounts to Nigeria 
giving what she does not possess or enjoy. Rather, it paints 
a picture of pursuing a big brother foreign policy, a show-
off of its immense physical and human resources.
Though, Nigeria is not in a state of war but it cannot 
be ascertained that the nation is enjoying peace. Nigeria 
has the fourth largest contingent in the United Nations 
Peacekeeping operations since 1960 having committed 
250,000 men and women losing 2,000 troops in the process 
and expending over 10 billion US dollars. Presently, 
Nigeria has more than 17, 000 troops serving under the 
world body. Regrettably, the nation’s contribution so 
far has not been anchored on solid economic diplomacy 
that could ensure rewards for fortunes invested. It seems 
Nigeria, been the most populous black nation on earth, 
feels fulfilled being perceived as the “giant of Africa” and 
“potential leader” of black race, arguably a self bestowed 
title. Nigerian leaders have seen issues of peace keeping as 
routine humanitarian assistance to other countries. It seems 
to have been paying lip service to its economic diplomacy 
initiated since 1988. The policy was to ensure adequate 
economic reward for government’s goal of economic 
revival and sustainable development. It is regrettable 
however that economic gain from Nigeria’s foreign policy 
has been non-existent over the years.
As mentioned earlier, Nigeria played a critical role 
in restoring peace to war-ravaged countries such as 
Liberia and Sierra-Leone after years of civil wars. It is 
also incontrovertible that Nigeria was at the forefront 
for the liberation of South Africa from the shackles of 
apartheid as well as playing crucial roles in ensuring 
countries like Angola Rhodesia were brought to a state 
of independence. Though, the foregoing represents one 
of the goals of Nigeria foreign policy which is to ensure 
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the freedom of countries under the yoke of colonialism, 
the question now is; how many of these countries that 
benefited from Nigeria’s rare generosity appreciate the 
nation’s sacrifices? The case of South-Africa readily 
comes to mind. As stated earlier, Nigeria stood for South 
Africa when it mattered most, yet Nigerians living in 
South Africa have been victims of xenophobic attacks in 
recent years, the worst being 2008 and 2015. The flaws 
in Nigeria’s foreign policy are further exposed with the 
emergence of South-African business interest including 
MTN, DSTV, SHOPRITE AND STANDARD BANK 
(Ade-Ibijola, 2013) dominating the Nigerian economic 
landscape especially in the banking, entertainment and 
telecom industries. The reverse should have been the case. 
This development is made possible because Nigerian 
leaders had not deemed it necessary to protect the nation’s 
economic interest by consciously navigating economic 
opportunities in assisted countries. A staunch economic 
diplomatic relations accompanying financial and human 
capital contributions to peace and stability in crises-
ravaged countries within the West-African sub-region 
and the African continent in general would have ripped 
off positively on Nigeria’s deteriorating economy that is 
dependent, disarticulated and peripherally integrated into 
the world capitalist economy. If the likes of South African 
originated companies mentioned above are recording 
high sales in Nigeria with huge profit expropriated back 
home, yet Nigerians living in South Africa are still been 
treated with disdain, then there is misuse of diplomatic 
instrument on the part of managers of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy. Due to its skilled economic diplomatic relations, 
South Africa is for many years the largest economy on the 
continent of Africa. Interestingly, South Africa has been 
able to use her multinationals to her advantage and this 
was a nation Nigeria fought for tirelessly. In 2012, South 
African immigration authorities deported more than one 
hundred Nigerians on a trivial issue of not possessing 
the yellow card vaccination certificate, a situation that 
led to diplomatic row between Abuja and Pretoria. The 
ugly development provoked some prominent Nigerians 
including Federal legislators to institute stiff actions 
against South Africa. In fact, some Senators called for 
the withdrawal of operating license from the MTN and 
immediate closure of Nigerian High Commission in 
South Africa. The argument suffice that there are Nigerian 
companies that can take over from them. The MTN makes 
far more profit in Nigeria than in her home country. The 
sanction theory expressly underscores Akinyemi’s (2004) 
viewpoint when he noted that: 
Countries in Africa should understand that they need Nigeria 
more than we need them … Nigeria’s foreign policy have been 
marred by fellow African countries that voted against us on the 
international scene. We have got to have a foreign policy, which 
penalizes countries that vote against us”
The above submission clearly indicates that there is 
absence of the needed impetus for economic benefits 
in Nigeria’s foreign policy and this, the country has 
suffered on many occasions. This is because countries 
that have benefitted from Nigeria’s “big brother” or 
father “Christmas” foreign policy often emerge to work 
against Nigeria’s interests in global politics when it 
mattered most. As earlier noted, Nigeria played a lead 
role in restoring peace to countries such as Liberia and 
Sierra -Leone after years of civil wars, this adventure 
cost Nigeria billion of US dollars. However, since these 
countries return to the path of peace, nations that did 
not undertake such sacrifices have been busy exploring 
economic opportunities. Economies of these nations have 
been dominated by France, Indian, China and Taiwan. 
If Nigeria had not expended blood and money in these 
countries to bring peace which they now enjoy, would they 
have had the opportunity to reap where they never sowed? 
If one may ask, are they to be blamed? Reasonably, the 
blame solely lies on the table of Nigeria’s leadership for 
not making the most benefits out of the situation created 
by socio-political crises in assisted countries.
Oyinlola (2010) emphasized that Nigeria has 
spent 10billion US dollars on the promotion of peace 
and stability and the eradication of every form of 
colonialism on the African continent since independence. 
He however lamented that it would have been more 
profitable to humanity if such funds were channelled 
to human and societal development. Arising from this 
position, it is obvious that Nigeria has got her priorities 
wrong. Otherwise, how does one explain that a country 
without peace like Nigeria could spend such money on 
peacekeeping in other nations? Nigeria is a nation where 
more than two third of the population live below one $1 
dollar per day, it is better imagined what 10billion dollars 
would have done in tackling socio-economic challenges. 
“The promotion and protection of the economic wellbeing 
of Nigerians” as stipulated in Nigeria’s foreign policy 
statement which ought to be paramount in the mind of 
the leadership has been relegated to the detriment of 
Nigerians. For instance, 1,000 Nigerian fatalities were 
recorded during Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia and 
Sierra Leonean crises that lasted for eleven years. The 
intervention also cost the national treasury billions 
of dollars (Vogts & Aminu, 1996). Nigeria must re-
prioritize in her foreign policy conducts by putting in 
place diplomatic machinery that would ensure adequate 
economic rewards while still participating in maintaining 
peace across the globe because economic interests matter 
even when peace, freedom, sovereignty and security 
issues seem paramount.
4. CHINA’S ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN 
AFRICA: LESSONS FOR NIGERIA 
Sino-Africa’s Socio-economic and political relations is 
a testament to the remarkable transformation of China’s 
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foreign policy which began in the early 1990s. This 
relationship means that China is deeply involved on the 
African continent in mutually benefiting arrangements 
which see china providing financial and technical aid to 
African countries while in return; it penetrates African 
economies for raw materials for its growing industries and 
market for its products. This has significantly improved 
China’s domestic economy, competing strongly for 
space in the global arena in the United States. China’s 
foreign policy as a whole is by and large considered to be 
more dynamic, constructive, flexible and self-confident 
than was the case during the 1970s and 1980s. China’s 
engagement with African countries clearly indicates that 
it is assimilating into the international system (Brzezinski 
& Mearshelmer, 2005, p.46). According to Tull (2006, 
p.462), China’s interactions with African states have 
manifested in the forms of its support for fairer global 
trade; support for an enlarged Security Council to 
accommodate African representatives; support for Africa’s 
various reform-oriented institutions such as the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the 
building of new African Union complex in Addis Ababa. 
Also, its increasing involvement in UN peacekeeping 
missions in Africa has been substantial. For instance, in 
2004, 1,400 Chinese participated in nine UN missions on 
the African continent while 558 troops were sent to war-
torn Liberia after the incoming Liberian government of 
2003 terminated its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
China’s robust economic diplomacy in Africa also 
included the cancellation of the bilateral debts with 31 
African countries totalling $1.27billion while 44% of its 
widely spread overall assistance to developing countries 
went to Africa in 2002 (Tull, 2006, p.463). Significantly, 
economic transactions underscore China most powerful 
evidence of increasing interests in the African continent as 
aptly noted by Tull (2006, pp.464-469) thus:
(a)  Between 1989 and 1997, Chinese African 
bilateral trade volume grew by 430%.
(b)  In  2003,  China  was  the  second b igges t 
exporter of goods (11%) to the member states 
of ECOWAS and in particular Nigeria, thus 
narrowing the gap with ECOWAS leading 
supplier, France.
(c)  bilateral trade volume reached $24bn in 2004.
(d)  1n 2004, china was reported to have oil stakes in 
as many as 11 African states. 
(e)  In 2004, state-owned China Eximbank released 
a $2bn loan package to Angola in exchange 
for 10,000 barrels a day of oil. The deal was of 
mutual benefit. While it enabled the Angolan 
regime to circumvent donor pressure for 
increased fiscal transparency, it will strengthen 
the Chinese foothold in the Angolan oil economy.
(f)  In the first ten months of 2005, Chinese-African 
trade grew by 39% to $32.17bn and as a result, 
China overtook the UK as Africa’s third most 
important trading partner in 2005 after the US 
and France.
(g)  700 Chinese enterprises with a total investment 
of about $1.5bn are operating in Africa as in 
2005. 
(h)  In January 2006, China’s offshore oil producer, 
GNOOC agreed to pay $2.3bn for a 45% stake 
in a Nigerian oil and gas field, its largest ever 
overseas acquisition.
Relatedly, Alden & Davies (2006) provided a 
staggering profile of Chinese operations in Africa which 
signifies further benefits of Beijing’s economic diplomatic 
relations with African states and their leaders: 
In pursuit of China’s broader global ambitions, 180 companies 
have been designated by the state to benefit from preferential 
finance, tax concessions and political backing to go “global” 
and become true multinationals. They are involved in mining 
and energy industries. In the extractive industries are Sinopec, 
CNOOC and China Minmetals corp. Huawei Technologies, 
ZTE Corporation, Lenovo and TCL are rapidly becoming global 
players in the ICT sector. China’s state-owned China National 
petroleum Corporation (CNPN) has invested in oil assets in 
Sudan and Chad. Another state-owned enterprise CNOOC has 
acquired energy interests in Morocco, Nigeria and Gabon. China 
already procures 28% of its oil and natural gas from Africa with 
Sudan and Angola leading exporters to the country. More than 
800 Chinese state-owned firms are now active in the African 
economy. 
Reviewing China’s commercial role in Africa, 
Elizabeth Economy (Cited in Alden & Davies, 2006, p.91) 
noted:
Whether oil in Angola, timber in Mozambique or Copper 
in Zambia, China is breathing new life into these African 
economies. All over Africa today, you will see Chinese 
construction firms building railroads, highways, telecoms, 
enormous dams, even presidential palaces.
Observably, China has gained substantial economic 
ground in Africa by taking opportunity of its large and 
cheap labour force to massively export goods to Africa 
that suffers acute poverty in vast parts of its territory 
thus offering low-price export goods such as textile and 
clothing, electronic devices and machines. Instructively, 
Beijing has cultivated the favour of governments in oil-
producing states and by extension, obtained privileged 
access and opportunities for its companies by dispensing 
soft loans and credit lines, development assistance, gifts 
and other incentives, arms deliveries and diplomatic 
backing. China thus provides a massive example for 
Nigeria on how nation-states take opportunities of 
prevailing socio-economic and political situations in 
other climes to launder their national interest through the 
instrumentality of economic diplomacy and use assistance 
they offer other nation-states to negotiate what they 
require to jumpstart or consolidate their development 
drive. Interestingly, Beijing’s economic diplomacy 
extends beyond the soils of Africa and has made inroad 
into other regions of the Middle East and Latin America. 
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Arguably, only on two occasions can Nigeria be seen to 
have significantly benefited from her economic diplomatic 
drives which have improved projection on Nigeria’s image 
and domestic economy. First was the achievement of a 
higher visibility for Nigeria in international organizations 
as a result of the successful projection of the nation’s 
image as the primus inter pares on the continent of Africa 
under the Babaginda’s regime in the early 1990s (Pogoson, 
2011) and second the successful negotiation of its foreign 
debt with both the Paris and the London clubs under the 
Obasanjo civilian administration. Through the negotiation, 
Nigeria significantly secured debt relief and slightly 
came out of economic doldrums which debt burden has 
imposed.
5. RE-THINKING NIGERIA’S FOREIGN 
P O L I C Y  T O W A R D S  E C O N O M I C 
D I P L O M A C Y :  S T A T E M E N T  O F 
CONCLUSION
There are no doubts that Nigeria has aspirations of being 
hegemonic in Africa and what is required are sound, 
articulated economy, stable polity and professional 
military (Ebohon & Isike, 2004). However, despite its 
huge human capital and material contributions to the 
restoration of peace and stability in crises-affected and 
war-torn African countries including the emancipation of 
some others from every form of neo-colonialism, Nigeria 
has abysmally failed to utilize the opportunity the crises 
present to establish her hegemonic aspirations on the 
continent. 
The insensitivity of Nigeria to accompany its foreign 
policy pursuit of peace and security as well as political 
stability of brother and sister African states with economic 
penetration of beneficiary states has held back Nigeria’s 
ascendancy as Africa’s political power. Invariably, this 
has opened the space for South Africa to compete with 
the most populous black nation in the world as Africa’s 
hegemonic and economic power house. This argument 
does not amount to asking Nigeria to project a veiled 
imperialistic manoeuvring intent of interfering in the 
domestic politics of assisted states in Africa as did 
Western countries in the global south (Tull, 2006, p.461). 
Rather, it is a challenge for Nigeria to construct a common 
identity with her African brothers and sisters in a mutually 
benefiting economic relationship that compensates for 
Nigeria’s sacrifices in stabilizing their countries and 
dislodge the asymmetric economic relations with the West 
has fostered with African states.
Nigeria requires charting a new foreign policy which 
must as a matter of necessity has as its principal tool 
economic diplomacy. Such effort requires the recognition 
of the “Nigerian” as the ultimate beneficiary of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy endeavour. To achieve this, Nigeria’s 
national interest must be cleverly and robustly articulated 
in a way that economic interests are embedded in financial 
and human capital investments in promoting peace and 
stability in the West-African sub-region and on the African 
continent. Arguably, African countries need Nigeria more 
than Nigeria needs them. The Nigerian state needs to 
take cue from Beijing’s economic diplomatic strategies 
and create space for private and state-owned businesses 
of Nigerian origin to venture into the economies of other 
African states particularly in oil and gas, solid minerals, 
textile and telecommunication industries. For this to 
thrive, Akinterinwa (2004, p.247) noted that realistic 
efforts must be made by Nigeria’s leadership to make 
Nigeria’s socio-economic and political environment 
conducive to the development of national capacity to meet 
the challenges of the current international conditions. 
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